The transparency theory of presupposition projection advocated by Schlenker (2008a) relies on two fairly independent assumptions. First, it describes the interaction between two Gricean maxims of manner given in (1) and (2). These two maxims together govern the use of explicit conjunctions and complex meanings (presuppositional items) to package information.
Achieving explanatory force
The transparency theory of presupposition projection advocated by Schlenker (2008a) relies on two fairly independent assumptions. First, it describes the interaction between two Gricean maxims of manner given in (1) and (2). These two maxims together govern the use of explicit conjunctions and complex meanings (presuppositional items) to package information.
(1) Be Articulate:
In any syntactic environment, express the meaning of an expression dd 0 as (d and dd 0 ). 1 (2) Be Brief (in brief ): A predicative or propositional occurrence of (d and x) is infelicitous in a position where d and is useless (i.e. in a position where any two expressions of the form (d and b) and b lead to contextually equivalent sentences).
These maxims lead to the following prediction: 2 (3) General prediction of the transparency theory: A sentence of the form jðdd 0 Þ presupposes that Eb a L, jðdbbÞ , jðbÞ.
Interestingly, one can show that in the propositional case, this prediction is equivalent to jðdÞ , jð>Þ, i.e. we only need to consider one possible sentence completion b: the tautology. Importantly however, this is only a (very e‰cient) technical shortcut and lengthy tautologous pieces are not necessary (see Chemla, 2006) . This first part of the theory accounts for the core projection facts: projection under negation, conditionals, quantified sentences etc.
Second, there is a processing module which governs the stage at which these Gricean mechanisms apply:
(4) Be Brief may take into account the whole sentence or it may abstract away from the end of the sentence and only take into account what precedes the (structural) position at which the presupposition trigger occurs.
This second insightful hypothesis introduces some optionality in the system, which thus can capture usual presuppositional linear asymmetries. In short, the e¤ects of presupposition triggers can be neutralized when they appear after the justification of their presupposition. For instance, if a presupposition trigger appears in the second half of a conjunctive sentence, and if the first conjunct entails the resulting presupposition, no presupposition is projected for the overall sentence, as in the following caricatural example:
(5) It is raining and Mary knows it/that it is raining.
Empirically speaking, the transparency theory is equivalent to the earliest and most robust versions of dynamic semantics such as Heim (1983) for a very wide variety of cases (full proof in Schlenker, 2007) . This empirical success is achieved without any assumption about the environments in which presupposition triggers may appear. The outcome only depends on the standard bivalent meanings of the various parts of the sentences involved: no speculation about, e.g., negations or conjunctions is needed (this criticism of dynamic approaches was already discussed in, e.g., Soames, 1989) .
Let me illustrate this point with a slightly less usual example. The exact semantics of conditional sentences is a matter of debate, and it is standard methodology to give them the semantics of material implication: the meaning of If a, b is close to the meaning of (sa or b). From this approximation, the dynamic meaning of a conditional could be reconstructed from the dynamic meanings of negation and disjunction. This is bad methodology for at least two reasons. First, there is more than one way to emulate the truth-conditions of material implication with negations and disjunctions -e.g., (sa or b), (b or sa). The problem is that each of these translations may lead to a di¤erent dynamic meaning for the overall expression so that the link between the conditional and the relevant translation needs to be motivated independently. 3 Second, conditional sentences are not material implications to begin with. The closeness in truth-conditions does not imply that there is any level of representation at which the two expressions are built from similar subcomponents (e.g., negation and disjunction). The situation is rather di¤erent with a semantically predictive algorithm like, e.g., the transparency theory. The input of such systems is the bivalent meaning of an expression, 4 the output is its presuppositional behavior. If we want an approximation of the output, it is fair to use an approximation of the input, i.e. an approximation of the truth-conditions, because no intermediate level of representation is needed before we can apply the algorithm. More importantly, any refined semantics for the conditionals could just as well feed the algorithm and lead to testable predictions. 5 So, the transparency theory resolves an old tension. Dynamic approaches are empirically powerful, but this has a serious cost: they are not predictive. The transparency theory is fully predictive and yet matches previous empirical results. That could be the end of the story: someone motivated what dynamic approaches got from stipulations. Paradoxically, the impact of the transparency theory on the field is quite the opposite so far: new competing approaches to presupposition projection emerge rapidly (Chemla, 2008b; Klinedinst and Rothschild, 2008; George, 2008; 3 LaCasse (2008) recently investigated a way to constrain the space of possible dynamic meanings for connectives. Rothschild (2008) investigated a di¤erent route. He o¤ers a way to derive the dynamic semantics of a given expression (e.g., a conditional) from the combination of all its possible reformulations. LaCasse, 2008; Rothschild, 2008 and even Schlenker, 2008b) . To me, this multiplication of new theories is due to the fact that Schlenker's work also reveals that:
1. A predictive theory is possible: Schlenker o¤ers various insights towards a predictive system, in particular the processing module mentioned in (4) is now available for virtually any predictive approach. 6 2. The empirical discussion is not settled. I will focus the rest of my comments on a particular aspect of this last point: projection from the scope of quantifiers.
Quantified sentences

The data
Sentence (6) contains a presupposition trigger, know, in the scope of the quantifier no. What is the resulting presupposition of this type of sentences?
(6) None of these 10 students knows that he is stupid.
There are two common answers to this question in the dynamic literature. Heim (1983) argues that (6) has the universal presupposition given in (7a).
On the other hand, Beaver (1994 Beaver ( , 2001 argues that it has the much weaker existential presupposition given in (7b). See Kadmon (2001, chapter 10) for discussion.
(7) a. Each of these 10 students is stupid. b. At least one of these 10 students is stupid.
The transparency theory goes with the first camp and predicts that presuppositions triggered from the scope of a quantifier give rise to universal presuppositions. This prediction is not dependent on the quantifier, and sentences like the following are predicted to raise the same universal presupposition: 6 Interestingly, this principle is not a priori restricted to presupposition projection theories, but may also apply to algorithms used to compute other kinds of implicatures (e.g., scalar implicatures where this principle could add a lot to the debate between so-called globalists and localists).
(8) a. Less than 3 of these 10 students know that they are stupid.
b. More than 3 of these 10 students know that they are stupid. c. Exactly 3 of these 10 students know that they are stupid. d. Quantifier of these 10 students know that Bound pronoun is stupid.
These predictions are problematic. From an utterance of (6), it is natural to infer that (7a) is true, but the strength of this inference decreases greatly for utterances of any of the sentences in (8). This claim is confirmed by experimental investigations described in Chemla (2008a) . These data are mentioned in appendix B of Schlenker (2008a) but no solution is o¤ered.
From the perspective of dynamic semantics, the presuppositions of quantified sentences are driven by the lexical entry of the quantifiers. In principle, it is technically possible to encode di¤erent presuppositional behaviors for di¤erent quantifiers, but this would be di‰cult to motivate on independent grounds and it is more parsimonious to postulate uniform presuppositional properties for all quantifiers. In a predictive framework, the di¤erence in bivalent meanings between quantifiers could naturally come into play and explain the contrasts we observe.
So, in my view, the predictions of the transparency theory are too conservative: there is no reason to stick to a uniform treatment of quantifiers in a predictive framework. In fact, this challenge raised by quantified sentences motivated at least in part new systems of presupposition projection: Chemla (2008b) and George (2008) . Alternatively, one may argue that the contrasts we see between quantifiers do not participate to the projection problem of presuppositions per se. I briefly discuss this possibility in the following section.
Various options Universal predictions þ weakening mechanisms (di‰culty?)
Let us imagine that the universal camp is right: no matter what the quantifier is, presuppositions project universally from the scope of a quantifier. The fact that the universal inference is often rejected for certain quantifiers might be due to di¤erences in the computations involved. For instance, it is known that downward monotonic environments lead to more di‰cult inferences (e.g., Geurts, 2003) . Thus, one could imagine that when a presupposition trigger appears in a downward monotonic environment, a lazy hearer/speaker does not go through the whole computation process needed for proper presupposition projection and therefore does not arrive to the universal presupposition. However, the experimental data show no di¤erence between the acceptance rate of universal presuppositions triggered from the scope of more than 3 and less than 3. If anything, Schlenker himself defends that the universal presupposition is more robust with less than 3, i.e. in the a priori harder downward monotonic environment. (I agree with these introspective judgments although this is typically a case of rather subtle and controversial contrast where an experimental confirmation with naive speakers would be needed).
Hence, if the transparency theory is right and if the lower acceptance rates of the universal inferences are due to some di‰culty in the application of the algorithm for some quantifiers but not others, we should be able to pin down the origin of this di‰culty. As discussed above, it is very unlikely that it corresponds to the relative di‰culty of monotonicity inferences.
Let me mention a solution which would be more specific to the transparency theory. It could be that some quantifiers require inspections of more ''potential second conjuncts'' (the b mentioned in (2)) to get to the full universal prediction. In other words, it is possible that a lazy speaker does not go all the way through the examination of all the potential expressions and therefore fails to reach the universal presupposition. I leave this challenge as an open issue for the transparency theory: what kind of di‰culty (or weakening mechanism in general) makes the presupposition weaker than expected in some quantified sentences but not others? I believe that a proper answer to this question would involve building a bridge with our understanding of general reasoning skills and thus requires proper experimental investigations.
Alternatives
There are two main empirical alternatives. First, it could be that the presupposition is the same for every quantified sentences, except that it is not universal but simply existential, as advocated by Beaver (1994 Beaver ( , 2001 for instance. In this type of theories, the universal inferences could be due to pragmatic enrichments of the existential presuppositions and the application of this enrichment may depend on the overall meaning of the original quantified sentence. Such a pragmatic or probabilistic strengthening mechanism remains to be stated explicitly, just as the weakening mechanism alluded to in the previous section.
Finally, we may try to account for the di¤erences between the various quantifiers within a predictive theory of presupposition projection. Chemla (2008b) and George (2008) o¤er such attempts. The challenge for this last type of approaches is to discover what the exact presuppositions of these sentences are -they might be intermediate between the existential and the universal options given in (7) -, how they vary with the bivalent meaning driven by the quantifier and yet explain why they sometimes support universal inferences.
The situation is both empirically and theoretically intricate. To determine whether the last word belongs to the theory of presupposition projection per se and which of the current approaches is on the right track, we may need to collect new kinds of data. This might require to work beyond the limits of standard linguistic methodology to collect and analyze, e.g., computation times which would inform us about the relative complexity of the relevant processes.
New demands on our theory of presupposition projection
The transparency theory sets up the stage for a new departure in the study of presupposition projection (this includes second inspections of oldfashioned theories, e.g., the revival of Gazdar's system by Klinedinst and Rothschild, 2008) . The system proposed in Schlenker (2008a) shows that we can hope for a predictive theory of presupposition projection; it even o¤ers various modules which can be used to match the good old results. Consequently, the expectations for new theories rises in another major aspect: the empirical predictions should be refined together with our understanding of the data themselves. (I illustrated this point with a particular aspect of quantified sentences, although it could be extended to other cases, e.g., disjunctions and connectives in general are discussed at length in Schlenker, 2008a) . Indeed, together with Schlenker's important theoretical progresses, psycholinguistic means now become available to investigate more subtle empirical data, and to draw bridges between linguistic knowledge and more general pragmatic and reasoning abilities.
